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Introduction 
Despite more than five decades of 
academic work, dividend policy has 
continued to attract further attention from 
different categories of users of financial 
statement which include regulators, 
investors and academic researchers. 
Dividend policy is among the key issues of 
financial policy of a firm (Ajanthan, 2013; 
Kim and Jeon, 2015). Dividend payout also 
serves as mechanism of addressing agency 
related problems as a consequence of 
separation of ownership and control 
(Francis et al., 2011; Jiraporn, Kim and Kim, 
2011). Agency theory suggested that 
dividend payment can reduce managers’ 
likelihood of perquisite consumption and 
empire building due excess cash available in 
the firm (Jiraporn, Kim and Kim, 2011; 
Boumosleh and Cline, 2015). Therefore, it is 
relevant to factor out among others what 
influences decision to pay or not to pay 
dividends among firms. 
Empirically, previous evidence has 
shown that the size of a firm, its profitability 
and growth are among the leading factors 
that determine firms’ propensity to pay 
dividends (Fama and French, 2001; 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 2004; 
Fatemi and Bildik, 2012) and firms 
corporate governance (Francis et al., 2011; 
Jiraporn, Kim and Kim, 2011; Boumosleh 
and Cline, 2015). Regarding the board 
diversity for example, the relationship 
between female director and dividend policy 
is still an open question, only a handful 
studies attempted to examine this 
relationship using data from the US (Byoun, 
Chang and Kim, 2016) China (McGuinness, 
Lam and Vieito, 2015) Spain (Pucheta-
Martínez and Bel-Oms, 2016) international 
study (Saeed and Sameer, 2017) and Nigeria 
(Idris, Ishak and Hassan, 2017). These 
studies revealed that shareholders are more 
likely to receive dividend when a female 
director is included in the board 
membership of a firm.  
Although some research has been 
conducted in this area but the findings may 
not be generalized for one reason or the 
other. Fundamentally, these studies (for 
example, Byoun et al., 2016; McGuinness 
et al., 2015; Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 
2016; Saeed & Sameer, 2017) are within the 
context of sophisticated market that have 
long advocated for greater participation of 
female directors in the board rooms. Also 
these markets may probably react 
favourable or otherwise to the disclosure 
or announcement of a director made by a 
firm for example, appointment of female 
director on board (Adams, Gray and 
Nowland, 2011). Additionally, the 
institutional setting of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly the Nigerian environment 
differs from those of the developed world 
as it is characterised by weak law 
enforcement mechanisms, abuse of 
shareholders’ right and negligence to the 
adherence of regulatory framework 
(Okpara, 2011). Perhaps, these issues may 
likely aggravate agency problems and in 
turn affect firms’ decision to pay dividends. 
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) suggested 
that to explore the value addition of 
governance structures of a given country, it 
could be interested to examine such 
structures individually. This is because 
every nation has  peculiar features in terms 
of, for instance regulatory framework, 
markets strength, economic atmosphere 
among others (Germain, Galy and Lee, 
2014). 
Therefore, this study is an extension 
of  Idris et al. (2017) by examining how 
female director(s) on board influence the 
probability of paying dividends to 
shareholders. This study posits that the 
perspective of female director(s) on the 
board may be quite distinct from those of 
the male as she may exert pressure on the 
management to pay dividends which could 
be a great opportunity to the shareholders 
to receive cash as a return on their 
investment. Hence, mitigating the agency 
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related problems between managers and 
owners of the firm by using dividends 
payout. The current study contributes to the 
extant literature on propensity to pay 
dividend through investigating the trends of 
female director on corporate boards after 
the Corporate Governance reforms that 
took place in 2011. The main contribution 
of this paper is employing a set of dataset 
from the second largest economy in the Sub
-Saharan Africa (Abor and Fiador, 2013). 
Moreover, the findings from this research 
supported the existing literature in this area 
documented from other markets. The study 
also contributes further by providing 
additional evidence on the influence of 
female director(s) on dividend policy among 
profitable firms. This is because prior 
evidence on propensity to pay dividends 
(Fama and French, 2001; Fatemi and Bildik, 
2012)  argued that firms’ profitability is an 
important factor in ascertaining whether a 
firm pays a dividend or otherwise. The 
study also shades more insight on the 
compliance level of firms in Nigeria with 
the 2011 code of Corporate Governance in 
relation to board diversity. Finally, it is 
expected that firms appointing female 
director on their board may exhibit more 
likely to pay dividends as oppose to male-
dominated boards. 
The remaining parts of this paper is 
structured as follows; brief background 
information on the Nigerian Code of 
Corporate Governance is discussed in the 
introduction, the theoretical and hypothesis 
development is situated in section 2, section 
3 provides a discussion on the methodology 
of the study. The discussion of results and 
findings are reported in section 4 and lastly 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
Corporate governance is an 
instrument or mechanism to protect 
shareholders against any expropriations 
from the managers. The first Code of 
Corporate Governance (hereafter CCG) in 
Nigeria was issued in 2003 which was aimed 
at curtailing the attitudes of some managers 
in running the affairs of the corporations. 
However, fast changing in business 
activities that result from information and 
communication technology among others, 
renders the then existing 2003 CCG 
obsolete.    
In this regard, the regulatory 
authority constituted the M.B. Mahmoud’s 
committee in 2008. The committee was in 
particular mandated to identify weaknesses 
and constrains to good corporate 
governance and further recommends ways 
by which greater compliance and aligning 
the code with the international best 
practices will be achieved (SEC Nigeria, 
2011). Accordingly, the committee 
conducted a thorough review and handed 
over the report in 2009. The need to have 
more inputs from the stakeholders and 
member of the public however, the SEC 
made a draft of the corporate governance 
and disclosed it in its website and the 
national dailies. Henceforth, the final CCG 
was later released and took effect from 
April 2011  (Ofo, 2011) and is referred to 
as the 2011 CCG.  
Among the changes made in the 
2011 CCG, a provision for diversity was 
made (Mordi and Obanya, 2014). The 2011 
CCG provides in section 4(1) that “The 
Board should be of a sufficient size relative 
to the scale and complexity of a company's 
operations and be composed in such a way 
as to ensure diversity of experience without 
compromising independence, compati-
bility, integrity and availability of members 
to attend meetings”. The 2011 CCG 
further stated that all firms should carefully 
consider gender composition when 
considering appointment of directors. This 
is documented in Section 13(2) “the criteria 
for the selection of directors should be 
written and defined to reflect the existing 
Boards strengths and weaknesses, required 
skill and experience, its current age range 
and gender composition”. Therefore, it is 
expected that changes should emerge for 
instance in financial policies of a firm as it 
complies with the 2011 CCG. 
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Agency theory and dividend payout 
 The agency theory suggested that 
managers tend to be the first wealth 
beneficiaries in the firm instead of the 
contributing shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982). Academic 
works have documented that the managers 
are more prone to employ the firms’ profit 
for their own benefit at the expense of the 
outside investors (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Also, Jiraporn et al. (2011) argued that the 
motives of the high cash retention in firms 
is to allow the managers of firms with weak 
governance practices to engage in either 
perquisite consumption or invest in project 
that has less benefit to the shareholders. In 
this regard, one of the leading mechanisms 
that could be used to address the agency 
problem is dividend (Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, 
1986). Dividend payment according to these 
theorists, deflate the available free cashflow 
thereby prompting the management to 
consider other sources of raising capital to 
finance new projects. Therefore, sourcing 
the fund that could be used in the new 
project for example, in the capital market 
will subject the managers to greater scrutiny 
that can guard  against wasting the 
shareholders’ funds (Saeed and Sameer, 
2017). Although dividend payout serves as a 
mechanism for monitoring the managers 
against expropriation, but the shareholders 
require individuals that can enforce the 
decision to pay the dividend. Since the 
shareholders do not act directly but through 
the directors sitting on the board.  
The board of the directors are the 
topmost individuals entrusted to the affairs 
of a firm and the success or otherwise of a 
firm are saddled on them. They are 
expected to define strategic goals and to 
ensure both financial and human resources 
are channelled towards attaining those 
strategic goals (Ofo, 2011). Therefore, firms 
need strong and well diversified board for 
instance presence of female director(s) on 
board that would enforce good governance 
practices and return the profits to the 
shareholders (Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-
Oms, 2016) and consequently, mitigating 
agency problems.  
Female on board 
Corporate boards around the world 
have been mainly dominated by male. 
However, board diversity in terms of 
gender representation on boards has 
attracted attention in recent times (Pucheta
-Martínez and Bel-Oms, 2016). Legislation 
around the globe for example, France, 
Germany, Malaysia, Kenya, South Africa 
and Nigeria, stipulates directly or otherwise 
the provision for recruiting female director 
on corporate board (Mordi and Obanya, 
2014). This provision is aimed at exploring 
or harnessing their talents, views and 
perceptions as well as contributions toward 
achieving the laid down organizational 
goal. Thus, the self-serving behaviour of 
managers as demonstrated by agency 
theorists could be addressed when female 
director is included on the board.  
Prior evidences have associated 
strong monitoring with a board that is 
diversified in terms of gender and indicate 
strong support for female influencing 
dividend payment as oppose to a male-
dominated board. Studies on female 
director on board (McGuinness, Lam and 
Vieito, 2015; Byoun, Chang and Kim, 
2016; Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms, 
2016; Pucheta-Martínez and López-
Zamora, 2017) have shown that 
shareholders are better protected to the 
extent that they could receive cash return 
in the form of dividend when female 
director is on board.  
Byoun et al. (2016) in their study 
using data from US provides that gender 
diverse board pays more dividends. 
Notably, the study reveals that diversity in 
relation to gender is more likely to offer 
solution to firms with greater exposure to 
agency problems. Thus, this evidence  is in 
agreement with Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
that gender diversity provides greater 
support in monitoring the opportunistic 
managers. Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms 
5 
 
(2016) investigated how female director 
impact on dividend policy from the Spanish 
market with a sample totalling 894 firms. 
The study revealed that the presence of 
female directors on board ensured 
significant positive effects on dividend 
policy. The results suggested that female 
directors on board may constrain the 
managerial opportunism with regards to 
dividends payout policy given their 
controlling role in the firm. Similarly, this 
results concur with the recent findings of 
Pucheta-Martínez and López-Zamora 
(2017) that the presence of female directors 
on boards is likely to address agency conflict 
in firms with opportunistic management 
using dividend payout.  
Examining the effects of gender 
diversity among the board members on 
corporate actions has also extended to the 
gender status of the CEO. McGuinness et 
al. (2015) employed Chinese firms to 
investigate the impact of female gender on 
dividend payout. They posited that female 
manager weakens the tendency of cash 
distribution. In support of their argument, 
the study found out that the level of 
dividend payout did not change with a 
female being the CEO of a firm. Also, the 
study revealed that firms with two or more 
female directors on a board are less likely to 
distribute more cash dividend. The authors 
further argued that the evidence could be 
the result of the financial knowledge 
exhibited by female directors on the board. 
Moreover, the result may be driven by the 
fact that the female CEOs as well as the 
female directors are more prevalence in the 
Chinese firms characterised with greater 
private ownership, lower level of assets in 
place and with higher growth potential. This 
finding however, is in contrast with Idris et 
al. (2017) who examined a handful of firms 
listed on the NSE between 2013-2015 using 
panel data approach and found out that 
firms having female director on board are 
more likely to influence firm to pay 
dividends. The study further suggested that 
increase in female director is likely to curb 
agency related problems. Based on the 
aforementioned empirical evidences the 
study conjectures that: 
H1: Firms listed on the NSE with at 
least one female director on board exhibit 
higher likelihood of paying dividends. 
Extant managerial literature has 
emphasized on the impact female 
directors’ have on corporate outcomes. 
Prior evidence such as Carter, D’Souza, 
Simkins and Simpson (2010)  and Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) associated the link 
between gender diversity and higher firm 
performance. They argued that the higher 
performance may be due to the emergence 
of a new and distinctive idea since it is a 
mixed gender board. Moreover, female 
director’s role has also been linked with 
positive perception towards taxation 
(Huseynov and Klamm, 2012) and lower 
probability to evade tax (Kastlunger et al., 
2010), higher stock market valuation 
(Ntim, 2013), enhancement of 
shareholders’ value (Nguyen and Faff, 
2007). These evidences provide that female 
director could lead to value addition if 
recruited on the corporate board. For 
instance, Terjesen, Sealy and Singh (2009) 
showed that mixed gender board may 
greatly inspires positive mentorship and 
networking. The study noted that the 
female on a mixed board serves as a role 
model for other females who aspire to be 
on corporate board. Hence, the female 
director provides a motivational benefit. 
Beside this benefit, the female director 
could also play a complementary role 
through exhibiting greater ability to 
manage conflict situations. Since female 
director is associated with several 
corporate outcomes which is beneficial to 
the shareholders. Therefore, it is probable 
that firms that continue to have female 
director on its board may influence 
dividend payment decision particularly that 
the 2011 CCG stipulates that listed firms in 
Nigeria should have a well-diversified 
board in terms of gender. In this sense, the 
study predicts that:  
Adamu,  Ishak & Hassan / Dividend payout among Nigerian firms 
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H2: Firms listed on the NSE that 
continue to have at least one female director 
after the 2011 CCG are more likely to pay 
dividend. 
Prior studies have documented that 
dividend payout may be an indication that 
firm is profitable and doing well (Fama and 
French, 2001; Ferris, Sen and Yui, 2006; 
Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010; Fatemi and 
Bildik, 2012; Byoun, Chang and Kim, 2016). 
It is likely that when profitable firms fail to 
disgorge cash to their shareholders, it will be 
exposed to a greater risk of managerial 
opportunism, perquisite consumption and 
empire building. Thus, having female 
director on board may influence the other 
board members to consider distributing the 
free cash flow to the owners with a view to 
mitigate agency problems (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Byoun, Chang and Kim, 
2016; Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms, 2016; 
Saeed and Sameer, 2017). Additionally, the 
female director(s) as role model may 
increase her ability and capability to protect 
owners’ interests given their (female) limited 
number corporate board (Terjesen, Sealy 
and Singh, 2009) and thus influencing the 
decision to pay dividend. Consistent with 
this argument, the study hypothesizes that:  
H3: Profitable firms listed on the 
NSE that appoint at least a female director 
are more likely to pay dividends. 
 
Methods 
The sample period is 2009-2015 
which consist of all listed non-financial 
firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
market. The use of non-financial firms for 
this study is in line with propensity to pay 
dividend literature (for instance, Sharma 
2011; Abdulkadir et al. 2016; McGuinness et 
al. 2015). The total number of the non-
financial firms is 105 and represent 66.5% as 
at 2015. Out of this figure, 16 firms were 
excluded because of missing data. The 
filtering further reduces the sample size to 
only 89 non-financial firms and represents 
53.6% of the total listed firms on the NSE 
market. Hence, with 623 firm-year 
observations. 
The dependent variable (DIVD) is 
estimated in two ways: (i) as a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 when a firm pays 
a dividend and 0 otherwise (Jiraporn, Kim 
and Kim, 2011; Sharma, 2011; Byoun, 
Chang and Kim, 2016; Pucheta-Martínez 
and Bel-Oms, 2016); (ii) (DITA) as a ratio 
of dividends to total assets of a firm 
(Jiraporn, Kim and Kim, 2011; Sharma, 
2011; Pucheta-Martínez and López-
Zamora, 2017). Conversely, female director  
(FEML) is the main independent variable 
of interest and the study follows (Byoun, 
Chang and Kim, 2016) to measure it as 1 if 
a firm has at least one female director on 
board during the period of the study 
otherwise 0. This variable (FEML) is also 
measured as a ratio of female director on 
board to the board size consistent with 
prior study (Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-
Oms, 2016; Idris, Ishak and Hassan, 2017). 
In line with the propensity to pay 
dividends, this study includes some firm 
characteristics as control variables due to 
their effect on dividend policy. The first 
control variable included is  firm age 
(FAGE) which is the number of years of 
firm since listing. Hu and Kumar (2004) 
and DeAngelo et al. (2004) showed that 
shareholders of older firms are more likely 
to receive dividends than highly growing 
and young firms. Assets growth (ASGT) is 
used as a proxy of growth opportunities 
and calculated as change in assets. The 
literature suggested that highly growth 
firms are less likely to pay dividends since 
the yearly returns would be invested (Fama 
and French, 2001; Fatemi and Bildik, 
2012). Prior evidence also documented that 
highly indebted firms are constrained in 
paying dividends to the shareholders 
(Pucheta-Martínez and López-Zamora, 
2017; Saeed and Sameer, 2017). Hence, the 
study controls for debt and is measured as 
ratio of total debts to total assets (FLEV). 
Moreover, the study also controls for 
board size (BSZE) as firms with larger 
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board may pay higher dividends (Chang and 
Dutta, 2012; Bradford, Chen and Zhu, 2013; 
Byoun, Chang and Kim, 2016). On the 
other hand, in line with previous studies (see 
for example, Grullon, Paye, Underwood, & 
Weston, 2011; McGuinness et al., 2015; 
Saeed & Sameer, 2017) this study winsorises 
all the continuous variable at the 5% and 
95% levels to minimize the effect of or 
potential threat of outliers. Lastly, year 2012 
was considered as the base year because the 
CCG came into effect in April 2011. Hence, 
all firms are expected to comply from 2012 . 
The current study employs logit and 
OLS regressions to conduct the analysis. 
Prior studies on decision to pay dividends 
(see for instance, Byoun et al., 2016; 
Jiraporn et al., 2011; McGuinness et al., 
2015; Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2016) 
have employed similar methodology. The 
model of the study is as follows: 
DIVDi = α0 + α1FEMLi + α2FAGEi + 
α3ASGTi + α4FLEVi + α5BSZEi + εi   
 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics  
The results from Table 1 provide 
details on the mean, standard deviation, 
median, minimum and maximum for all the 
variables under consideration. The results 
from this table show that on the average, 
60.5% of the non-financial listed firms pay 
dividend during the period of study. In 
comparison, this statistics is above 56% 
that was reported by Pucheta-Martínez and 
Bel-Oms (2016) and McGuinness et al. 
(2015) from the Spanish and US markets 
respectively. Furthermore, the average ratio 
of dividend to total assets of the non-
financial listed firm is 2.6%.  On the 
average 57.1 % of the sample firms for this 
study have at least one female director on 
board with either executive or non-
executive status during 2009-2015.  
For the control variables, the mean 
age for the sample is 20.9 years with 
growth opportunity of 6% per year. More 
so, 9.5% represents the average ratio of 
debt to total assets of these listed firms. 
This ratio is far below 21.5% and 60% 
reported for the US market (Jiraporn, Kim 
and Kim, 2011) and Spanish market 
(Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms, 2016) 
respectively. Thus, this implies that listed 
Nigerian firms may use less debt to finance 
their assets. Consequently, the statistic 
shows that the mean value of the board 
size for the Nigerian non-financial listed 
firms is 8.6 which is lower than 10.7 when 
compare with the board size of the Spanish 
firms previously documented by Pucheta-
Martínez and Bel-Oms (2016).  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Note the flowing: DIVD = dividend decision; DITA = dividend to total Assets; FEML = female director(s) on 
board; FAGE=firm age; ASGT = assets growth; FLEV = firm leverage; BSZE = board size. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max 
DIVD 0.605 0.489 1.000 0.000 1.000 
DITA 0.026 0.039 0.009 0.000 0.143 
FEML 0.571 0.495 1.000 0.000 1.000 
FAGE 20.992 12.723 21.000 2.000 39.000 
ASGT 0.060 0.176 0.039 -0.308 0.457 
FLEV 0.095 0.122 0.035 0.000 0.415 
BSZE 8.621 2.193 9.000 5.000 17.000 
Adamu,  Ishak & Hassan / Dividend payout among Nigerian firms 
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Correlation results 
The analysis of the correlation 
reported in Table 2 indicates that dividend 
decision has a positive and strong 
correlation with female directors on board. 
Hence, the correlation results provide an 
indication of the possible relationship 
between decision to pay dividend and 
female directors on board in the main 
regression model of the study. For the 
control variables as can be seen from the 
correlation table, firm age and assets growth 
is correlated positively with dividends and 
statistically significant at 1% and 10% 
respectively. Contrarily, firm leverage is 
found to have a negative correlation and 
statistically insignificant while, the 
correlation between dividend decision and 
board size is positive and statistically 
significant.  
The study also examines whether 
multicollinearity is a threat to findings. 
Based on the analysis which is reported in 
Table 2, it shows that none of the variables 
has a variance inflation factor above the 
cut-off point of 10. Hence, confirming the 
absence of multicollinearity in the study as 
suggested by Gujarati (2004). 
Univariate analysis 
The analysis of mean difference is 
also performed for three different periods 
using two sample t-test and is reported in 
Table 3. The sampling is classified into 
three periods: All periods (2009-2015); pre-
CCG (2009-2011) and post CCG (2013-
2015) to further ascertain whether the two 
groups of firms constructed based on the 
dividend payout differs with regards to the 
influence of female director on board as 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
 (***), (**), (*) significant at 1%. 5% 10% respectively. Note the flowing: DIVD = dividend decision; FEML = female director
(s) on board; FAGE=firm age; ASGT = assets growth; FLEV = firm leverage; BSZE = board size. 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  VIF 
1. DIVD  1.000            1.09 
2. FEML  0.156***  1.000          1.07 
3. FAGE  0.149***  0.072  1.000        1.05 
4. ASGT  0.095*  0.002  0.011  1.000      1.01 
5. FLEV  -0.098  -0.069  -0.162***  0.002  1.000    1.06 
6. BSZE  0.180***  0.204***  0.083*  0.013  0.121**  1.000   1.10 
Table 3. Comparison of means for non-paying and paying dividend firms 
 
(***), (**), (*) significant at 1%. 5% 10% respectively 
  Non-Paying dividends  Paying dividends 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean diff 
ALL PERIODS (2009-2015)  0.476  0.500  0.634  0.482  -0.158*** 
PRE-CCG (2009-2011)  0.542  0.501  0.613  0.489  -0.070 
POST-CCG (2013-2015)  0.411  0.494  0.663  0.474  -0.251*** 
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the independent variable. The results 
reported from the t-test in Table 3 show 
that two (All periods and post CCG) out of 
the three periods were statistically 
significant. Thus, indicating that female 
director may likely influence the distribution 
of cash dividend to the shareholders. The 
findings also may suggest that the provision 
for female director on board in the 2011 
CCG has impacted much on the corporate 
cash payout among the sample firms in the 
current study. 
Regression analysis  
Table 4 depicts the results of the 
regression for female directors on board. In 
conducting the regression, three models 
were constructed. Model 1 reports the 
regression performed for the entire 
sampling period, 2009-2015 with decision to 
pay dividend as the dependent variable. In 
the second model of Table 4 the regression 
is performed for the period 2009-2011 and 
is referred to as pre-CCG. In last model, 
the analysis is on post-CCG the period 
between 2013-2015. In all these periods, 
the variable of interest is female director 
with four control variables. The pseudo R2 
of first model is 6.16% which is higher 
than 5.11% in the second model and lower 
than 10.38% for the last model. The small 
pseudo R2 reported in the study may not 
be a threat to the model fit as pseudo R2 
cannot be equated to R2 in OLS models 
(Hosmer, Lemeshow and Sturdivant, 
2013). Studies (for example, McGuinness 
et al., 2015) also reported very low pseudo 
R2. Looking at the three models shown in 
Table 4.4, the Chi-square is statistically 
significant at 1% throughout the three 
periods. 
Table 4. Binary logit regression 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (***), (**), (*) significant at 1%. 5% 10% respectively. Note the flowing: DIVD = dividend decision; FEML 
= female director(s) on board; FAGE=firm age; ASGT = assets growth; FLEV = firm leverage; BSZE = board size. 
  
ALL FIRMS 
(1) 
ALL PERIODS 
2009-2015 
(2) 
PRE-CCG 
2009-2011 
(3) 
POST-CCG 
2013-2015 
FEML  0.474***  0.191  0.826*** 
   (0.175)  (0.273)  (0.269) 
FAGE  0.0194***  0.0149  0.0220* 
   (0.00690)  (0.0103)  (0.0114) 
ASGT  1.173**  1.644**  1.446 
   (0.527)  (0.783)  (0.890) 
FLEV  -1.628**  -2.699***  -1.155 
   (0.709)  (0.993)  (1.125) 
BSZE  0.161***  0.0949  0.227*** 
   (0.0431)  (0.0648)  (0.0655) 
Constant  -1.515***  -0.694  -2.369*** 
   (0.374)  (0.544)  (0.626) 
Observations  623  267  267 
Log-likelihood  -392.22  -170.58  -161.11 
p-value of Chi-sq.  50.65***  18.38***  31.11*** 
Pseudo R2  6.16%  5.11%  10.38% 
GOF test Chi-sq. (10)  0.2738  0.4212  0.8773 
% Corr. Predic.  64.21%  62.17%  67.79% 
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The fitness of the three models are 
ascertained using Hosmer-Lemeshow test. 
This test indicates how well the binary logit 
model fits the data. In partitioning the 
observations, the conventional 10 groupings 
are used. In all the three models, the Chi-
Square were found to be statistically 
insignificant and accordingly, the models are 
statistically fits. Another goodness of fit 
conducted is the predictive accuracy. The 
performance of the models is interesting. In 
all the models, the overall predictive 
accuracy is above 50%. Although the pre-
CCG has the lowest score of 62.17% among 
the remaining models. This is consistent 
with Pampel (2000) who opined that the 
predictive accuracy lies between 50% and 
100% of correctly predicted cases. Finally, 
in the entire regression models, robust 
standard errors are used which may allow 
the study to correct the potential threat of  
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
threat (Rogers, 1993). 
For all these three models in Table 4, 
the dependent variable is one if a firm pays 
a dividend otherwise zero. The study 
attempts to determine the influence of 
female director on the dividend decision 
around three different periods of the CCG, 
the main variable of interest is still female 
director. As expected, the coefficient of 
female director on board is positive and 
significant in Model 1 and Model 3, 
therefore agrees with Hypotheses 1 and 2 
respectively. Indicating that the 2011 CCG 
has contributed a lot to the payment of 
dividend as firms with at least one female 
director on board shows a higher 
likelihood of dividend payment. This 
evidence supports the univariate analysis 
performed in this study. Furthermore,  the 
overall results in line with the previous 
studies (McGuinness, Lam and Vieito, 
2015; Byoun, Chang and Kim, 2016; 
Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms, 2016; 
Table 5. Binary logit regression models for the profitable firms in the sample 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   (***), (**), (*) significant at 1%. 5% 10% respectively. 
  
PROFITABLE FIRMS 
(1) 
ALL PERIODS 
2009-2015 
(2) 
PRE-CCG 
2009-2011 
(3) 
POST-CCG 
2013-2015 
FEML  0.426**  0.0548  1.003*** 
   (0.210)  (0.312)  (0.338) 
FAGE  0.0305***  0.0258**  0.0366** 
   (0.00833)  (0.0117)  (0.0148) 
ASGT  -0.0917  -0.0947  0.0678 
   (0.641)  (0.901)  (1.076) 
FLEV  -0.380  -1.158  -0.227 
   (1.008)  (1.431)  (1.561) 
BSZE  0.160***  0.0610  0.292*** 
   (0.0530)  (0.0774)  (0.0798) 
Constant  -1.272***  -0.100  -2.870*** 
   (0.442)  (0.617)  (0.745) 
Observations  505  227  210 
Log-likelihood  -284.58  -135.60  -107.91 
p-value of Chi-sq.  37.86***  0.1186  33.54*** 
Pseudo R2  6.01%  2.7%  0.14% 
GOF test Chi-sq. (10)  0.2193  0.0340  0.7593 
% Corr. Predic.  70.30%  69.16%  72.38% 
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Idris, Ishak and Hassan, 2017; Pucheta-
Martínez and López-Zamora, 2017) that 
female director(s) on board force managers 
to distribute cash dividends to the 
shareholders and thereby weakening the 
possibilities that managers use the free cash 
flow for perquisite consumption, empire 
building among others which are not to the 
best interest of the shareholders. Hence, 
consistent with the agency theory.  
Furthermore, to test hypothesis 3, the 
study conducts another analysis by 
excluding firms with negative earnings from 
the main sample in all the three periods (all 
period, pre and post CCG) since they may 
constrain the payment of dividends. The 
results are documented in Table 5. From 
this table, the coefficient of the variable of 
interest is also positive and statistically 
significant at 5%. Thus, the influence of 
female director on decision to pay dividend 
persist and in this case supporting 
hypothesis 3 . The results are in support of 
the prior studies of Pucheta-Martínez and 
Bel-Oms (2016) who found profitable 
firms to have higher probability of 
dividend payout. 
Additional analysis 
In other to confirm the robustness 
of the findings, we conduct additional test. 
Firstly, the study uses ratio as an alternative 
measure of female director. This measure 
has been used by other  studies in this area 
(see for example, Idris et al., 2017; Pucheta
-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2016; Saeed & 
Sameer, 2017). The model is re-estimated 
for the three periods (all period, pre and 
post CCG). The results are documented in 
Table 6. 
Table 6. Binary logit regression (ratio of female director to board size) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   (***), (**), (*) significant at 1%. 5% 10% respectively. FMLE = ratio of female directors on 
board to board size 
  
ALL FIRMS 
(1) 
ALL PERIODS 
2009-2015 
(2) 
PRE-CCG 
2009-2011 
(3) 
POST-CCG 
2013-2015 
FEML  2.298**  0.845  3.474** 
   (1.014)  (1.630)  (1.566) 
FAGE  0.0186***  0.0147  0.0212* 
   (0.00685)  (0.0103)  (0.0110) 
ASGT  1.162**  1.634**  1.376 
   (0.526)  (0.783)  (0.884) 
FLEV  -1.616**  -2.698***  -1.143 
   (0.710)  (0.995)  (1.138) 
BSZE  0.177***  0.103*  0.249*** 
   (0.0426)  (0.0627)  (0.0659) 
Constant  -1.565***  -0.719  -2.387*** 
   (0.378)  (0.549)  (0.629) 
Observations  623  267  267 
Log-likelihood  -393.21  -170.69  -163.01 
p-value of Chi-sq.  48.07***  18.04***  27.72*** 
Pseudo R2  5.9%  5.0%  9.3% 
GOF test Chi-sq.Prob (10)  0.1600  0.5819  0.6973 
% Corr. Predic.  63.56%  62.92%  66.67% 
Adamu,  Ishak & Hassan / Dividend payout among Nigerian firms 
12 
 
Jurnal Ekonomi Modernisasi, 15(1) 2019, 1-16  
The variable of interest from this 
result reported in Table 6 remains intact as 
previously reported. Although, the 
significant level has changed from 1% in 
Table 4 to 5% in Table 6 for both model 1 
and model 3. Thus, the influence of female 
director on decision to pay dividend persist. 
Summarily, the result confirms the earlier 
findings of the study and the change in the 
measurement of the variable of interest does 
not affect the results.  
Secondly, consistent with the 
propensity to pay dividends (Jiraporn, Kim 
and Kim, 2011; Sharma, 2011; Pucheta-
Martínez and Bel-Oms, 2016), the study also 
examine the effect of female director(s) on 
board on the level of dividend payout 
policy. The study in this case, excludes all 
non-dividend paying firms in other to carry 
out the estimations with dividend to total 
assets as the dependent variable. Table 7 
reveals the OLS regression analysis with 
robust standard errors. Consistent with the 
previous evidence presented in Table 4 and 
Table 5, results remain intact. Female 
director as can be seen is found to be 
positive and statistically significant in 
Model 1 and Model 3. This evidence 
concurs with the existing results of the 
current study. Therefore, the results all 
things been equal, provide strong evidence 
that within the dividend paying firms, firms 
with female director may lead to higher 
dividend payout.  
Table 7. Ordinary least squares regression using DIITA as the dependent variable 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (***), (**), (*) significant at 1%. 5% 10% respectively. Note the flowing: DITA = dividend to total Assets; 
FEML = female director(s) on board; FAGE=firm age; ASGT = assets growth; FLEV = firm leverage; BSZE = board size.  
  
ALL FIRMS 
(1) 
ALL PERIODS 
2009-2015 
(2) 
PRE-CCG 
2009-2011 
(3) 
POST-CCG 
2013-2015 
FEML  0.00604*  0.00334  0.00912** 
   (0.00309)  (0.00542)  (0.00390) 
FAGE  0.000270**  0.000349  0.000248 
   (0.000128)  (0.000219)  (0.000175) 
ASGT  0.0410***  0.0422***  0.0423*** 
   (0.00866)  (0.0136)  (0.0125) 
FLEV  -0.0383***  -0.0435**  -0.0351** 
   (0.0119)  (0.0199)  (0.0152) 
BSZE  0.00214***  0.00156  0.00260*** 
   (0.000712)  (0.00117)  (0.000997) 
Constant  4.27e-05  0.00801  -0.00806 
   (0.00622)  (0.0101)  (0.00895) 
Observations  623  267  267 
R-squared  0.084  0.072  0.121 
F-Stat  11.78  4.32  7.69 
P-Value(F)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
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Conclusion  
This study investigates the 
relationship between decision to pay 
dividends and female director(s) on board. 
The findings of the study show that firms 
with female director are more likely to affect 
the distribution of cash dividend with a view 
of addressing agency conflict. Further, 
additional analysis was carried out to 
ascertain the robustness of the result such as 
reducing the sample to profitable and 
dividend paying firms while estimating the 
models with logit and OLS regressions. 
This study is important as it provides 
strong evidence on the provision made by 
the 2011 CCG in which required firms listed 
on the NSE to have a diversity in terms of 
female on their board and in turn influences 
financial policies for example dividend 
policy. Moreover, the findings from this 
research supported the existing literature in 
this area documented from other markets 
where they found out that female director 
on board have strong effect on firms’ 
dividend payout. 
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